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Remembering Reactions and Facts: 
The Influence of Subsequent Information 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University 
Memory for reactions and judgments about a biographical passage was· examined 
following the presentation of subsequent information relevant to the passage. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that reaction memory shifted as a function of the 
type of subsequent information when 3 weeks separated it from the memory test, 
but not when testing was immediate or when the information was delivered just 
prior to the delayed test. These results were obtained again in Experiment 2 and 
contrasted to shifts in memory for· passage facts. Misleading factual information 
influenced memory for passage facts most when it was delivered just before the 
delayed recognition test. Similar effects occurred in Experiments 3 and 4 despite 
changes making the bias and test procedures for reaction and fact memory more 
comparable. The different ways that memories for reactions and facts are influ­
enced by later information are discussed in terms of the loci of reaction and fact 
generation (internal and external). 
When reporting memories of events, we 
often intersperse our reactions to the event 
with facts about the event. Within an on­
going narrative we may inform our audience 
about our feelings or judgments regarding 
specific aspects of the event, sometimes in an 
overt fashion ("I was angry that he said that 
in front of everyone") and sometimes more 
implicitly ("I knew he should have kept his 
mouth shut"). Although reactions such as 
these are sometimes described as products of 
an affective processing system (Zajonc, 1 980), 
little is known about affective reactions as 
data within the cognitive system. Even when . 
·reactions are defined as idiosyncratic infer­
ences within a strictly cognitive system, we 
understand little about how they are remem­
bered. Yet, because later events occur to 
modify our initial reactions, it is reasonable 
. Experiment 1 was conducted as Experiment 1 of my 
dissertation, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the 
PhD degree from the University of New Mexico. The 
data from Experiment 1 were reported at the meeting 
of the Midwestern Psychological Association, St. Louis, 
May 1980. I am gratful to Linda J. Anooshian, Elizabeth 
F. Loftus, Richard M. Shiffrin, and Daniel M. Wegner 
for comments on an earlier version of this article, and 
to Diane Sausen, Renee Wilson, and Katen Finke for. 
assisting in the collection of data far Experiments 2 and 
3. I give a special nate of thanks to Henry C. Ellis, whose 
advice influenced the direction of this research. 
Requests far reprints should be sent to Paula T. Her­
tel, Department of Psychology, Trinity University, 7 1 5  
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to suspect that, in changing our minds, we 
influence our abilities to accurately recall 
those initial reactions. Memory for reactions 
might therefore be susceptible to interference 
and reconstructive effects like those that op­
erate in memory for factual information. 
A variety ·of experiments have demon­
strated that memory for selected aspects of 
factual information can be influenced or 
biased by thematically related information 
encountered later (Dooling & Christiaansen, 
1 977; Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1 978; Schus­
tack & Anderson, 1 979; Snyder & Uranow­
itz, 1 978; Spiro, 1 980). The results of many 
of these experiments have also suggested that 
the influence increases with the length of the 
delay before remembering; an excellent ex­
ample of this increase in influence overtime 
is pr:ovided in Spiro's study of passage 
memory. 
After reading a passage about two college 
students who fell in love, subjects in Spiro's 
experiment were incidentally provided with 
outcome information about the couple's rela­
tionship. Outcome information was either 
consistent with the end of the passage (e.g., 
the outcome of marriage was consistent with 
a passage ending that stressed agreement 
about not having children), or the outcome 
was contradictory (the outcome of a split in 
the relationship was contradictory to the pas­
sage ending on an agreeable note). Some sub-
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jects had been deceived regarding a later test 
of passage memory, whereas others believed 
they were participating in a typical memory 
experiment. Only the former set of instruc­
tions led to errors in passage recall of the type 
that indicated the influence of the contradic­
tory outcome information, and these. errors 
occurred following either a 3- or 6-week de­
lay, but not after a 2-day delay. 
An interesting aspect of Spiro's findings for 
the present research on memory for reactions 
concerns instructions to deceived subjects. 
For these subjects the passage was described 
as a true story; they were directed to think 
about the story because they would be asked, 
ostensibly, to react to it in the second session.' 
Spiro believed that these instructions en­
couraged the subjects to employ previous 
cognitive structures and that only under 
those conditions should evidence for an ef­
fect of the outcome be found. What appears 
equally interesting is that although subjects 
were never asked to indicate their reactions, 
their later recall may have reflected those re­
actions as well as any new reactions resulting 
from the outcome information. Further­
more, distinguishing between reactions to a 
passage and facts from the passage may have 
important implications for understanding 
the influence of subsequent information on 
memory. 1 
In the context of passage information, re­
actions are defined as overt or covert verbal 
responses that �e affectively based and spe­
cific to a particular event or type of event 
described by the passage. First, reactions may 
contain affective components or express 
emotions, as do beliefs, judgments, and 
impressions (Zajonc, 1 980). Similarly, reac­
tions may express inferences about the emo­
tions of others, which in turn must be based 
on stored information of an affective nature. 
Second, the word reaction implies specificity 
of the response; the respoQse does not occur 
"out of the blue" but in reaction to some 
external event. In this sense, the affective 
components of reactions may be directly 
evoked by the event. As a response, a reaction 
must be generated, constructed or made by 
the individual. In contrast, facts are not made 
but exist independently of individual in­
volvement. Facts are objectively verifiable 
descriptions of events within the passage. 
Thus, reactions and facts both may be stored 
in memory, the first as a representation of 
how the individual felt or thought (the rep­
resentation of a construction), the second as 
the representation of an external state of af­
fairs. (The representation of a fact may be 
"constructed" or elaborated, but not the fact 
itself.) Subsequent information may affect 
memory for the reaction by evoking some­
what different reactions. Subsequent infor­
mation may affect memory for facts by stat­
ing or inferring competing facts. These sub­
sequent reactions or facts may then serve as 
sources of interference in attempts to remem­
ber the original reactions or facts. 
In the following experiments, memory for 
reactions to a biographical passage was in­
vestigated by varying the type of outcome 
information designed to alter reactions. Ex­
periment 1 examined the temporal condi­
tions for influencing memory for reactions. 
As is the case in memory for facts, longer 
retention intervals were expected to be as� 
sociated with larger effects of subsequent in­
formation ( cf. Spiro, 1 980). In. addition, the 
timing of outcome information within the 
interval was also expected to affect accuracy. 
Presented immediately prior to the test, ep­
isodic memory for the outcome might dif­
ferentiate reactions to the outcome from pre­
vious reactions. Therefore, outcome infor­
mation was_ predicted to affect reaction 
memory to a greater extent when a delay sep­
arated the outcome bias and the test. In Ex­
periment 2, bias effects in memory for re­
actions were compared with those in mem­
ory for facts from the passage. Finally, in 
Experiments 3 and 4 these comparisons were 
further explored. 
Experiment 1 
A general procedure was developed for 
measuring reactions and changes in reactions 
to information presented in a biographical 
passage. The procedure altered Spiro's meth­
ods to include an assessment of reactions 
(reaction task) following the passage and 
prior to the presentation of outcome infor­
mation; the recall task was replaced by a task 
to assess memory for previous reactions. 
Described more completely below, the re­
action task required subjects to indicate the 
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extent of their agreement with several state­
ments about the characters in the passage. As 
judged by independent raters, none of the 
statements referred only to the biographical 
passage information. Instead, they expressed 
inferences about the preferences and feeling 
of the major character. Two forms of the list 
of statements were available and differed 
only in the specific wording of the state­
ments. One form served as an indicator of 
initial reactions; the alternate form was used 
to test memory for initial reactions. (Forms 
and purposes were counterbalanced.) In the 
memory task, subjects were instructed to in­
dicate memory for their initial reactions, 
rather than reacting anew. Statements in the 
reaction task were designed to be sensitive 
to changes in reactions resulting from one of 
two types of biasing outcomes, presented af­
ter the original reaction task. The retention 
· interval and locus of the putcome delivery 
within the interval were each varied in order 
to assess previously discussed notions of the 
time required to accommodate reactions to 
the outcome. 
Method 
Materials. The biographical passage used in all con­
ditions of the experiment (see Appendix) described cer­
tain aspects of the life of a hypothetical person, Donna 
Madison, including her schooling, marriage, husband, 
children, and hobbies. The passage was constructed to 
be relatively neutral with respect to each of two out­
comes, which in turn corresponded to either a traditional 
or a nontraditional role for women. 
For the reaction task, two lists of 14 statements were 
constructed. The Appendix provides examples. A scale 
was provided at the top of each form, indicating judg­
ments of certainly true (I) to certainly false (6). For each 
form, half of the statements were designed to receive low 
ratings from a traditional point of view ("She values her 
role as wife and mother above all "), whereas the other 
half would deserve low ratings from a nontraditional 
view ("Donna probably feels that her husband has suc­
ceeded at her expense"). The direction of the rating was 
reversed for each statement on the alternate form. Ap.. 
proximately equal numbers of positive and negative 
statements were distributed within each half of each 
form. In general, Form I was constructed to avoid ex­
traneous preferenCes of any kind, and Form 2 contained 
reversals (affirmation or negation) of statements on 
Form I. Statement order was randomized. 
Uniform scores for the reaction task were obtained 
by inverting the ratings for nontraditional statements on 
each form (I became 6, 2 became 5, . . .  , 6 became 1). 
The inverted ratings were then summed with the non­
inverted ratings; high scores reflected a nontraditional 
reaction and low scores a traditional reaction. 
Subjects and design. Nine volunteers from introduc­
tory psychology classes participated in each of the 12 
cells of the factorial design. Factors were bias-test con­
dition (immediate bias and immediate test [II], imme­
diate bias and delayed test [IDJ, or delayed bias and 
delayed test [DD]), bias type (traditional or nontradi­
tional), and initial reaction form (I or 2). Subjects were 
required to return for the second session 3 weeks after 
the first session regardless of test condition, in order to 
obtain credit in their courses. Those who failed to return 
were evenly distributed across conditions and were re­
placed by additional subjects. Approximately equal 
numbers of each sex participated within conditions. 
Procedure. The order and conditions for the proce­
dures in Experiments I and 2 are shown in Table I. At 
the beginning of the initial session, subjects were told 
that they were participating in two short studies, the 
second of which had been delayed for 3 weeks because 
of a failure to receive all the materials. The first session 
was described as part of a study about reactions to real­
world events as they normally occur outside an exper­
imental setting; for this reason a true story about real 
people would be used. Subjects were allowed 5 minutes 
to read and think about the prose passage, and another 
10 minutes to complete the reaction forms. This con­
stituted the acquisition phase for all conditions. 
Following the collection of reaction forms, the ex­
perimenter initiated a pseudo-debriefing session by men­
tioning that the story had been written about 4 years 
ago by a graduate student in sociology who was a friend 
of both the experimenter and the woman in the story. 
The name of the woman had, of course, been changed. 
The student had simply wanted to get an idea of how 
university students would react to various kinds of social 
information. Recently, she had contacted the experi­
menter, requesting the collection of more data, because 
she wanted to find out if various kinds of social changes 
had occurred on this campus. At this point, subjects in 
the delayt;d-bias condition (DD) were dismissed, whereas 
those in the immediate-bias conditions (II and ID) re­
ceived biasing information. Subjects selected to hear the 
traditional bias were told, "In case you'd like to know 
what happened to the woman in the story, my friend 
mentioned that she recently had another baby and was 
really enjoying it. The other kids were ge{ting so big and 
she had missed having a baby in the house. " Subjects 
slated for the nontraditional bias heard, "In case you'd 
like to know what has happened to the woman in the 
story, my friend mentioned that shortly after the story 
had been written, the woman went back and finished 
her B.A. She is now a graduate student in physiological 
psychology in California and she is looking for a research 
position." 
Following delivery of the bias, subjects in the ID con­
dition were dismissed, whereas those in the II condition 
were tested, with the alternate reaction form, before the 
session was terminated. Instructions for this condition 
were as follows: 
There is one more task to do today. I have another 
form, similar to the one you just filled out. I want to 
make sure that the two forms do not differ. Please try 
to remember your initial reactions while completing 
the first form, and base your responses to this form 
on that memory only. Do not rely on your memory 
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for the numbers you chose because this form is worded 
differently and will not be scored the same. Save your 
questions until the end, so that you do not influence 
the way others respond. 
were identical to the immediate-test instructions follow­
ing a more appropriate introduction: 
During the second session, subjects in the II condition 
were debriefed, those in the ID condition were tested 
and debriefed, and those in the .tiD condition received 
the bias, were tested, and debriefed. In the DD condition, 
delivery of the bias occurred following the second sen­
tence of the delayed-test instructions. The bias was mod­
ified to indicate that the experimenter had just spoken 
with the sociology graduate student. These instructions 
The materials for the second study never have arrived, 
but I have come up with a second �k for you to do. 
Do you remember the story you read last time? (Bias 
for DD condition: Oh, by the way . . . .  ) Now, I want 
you to take a minute to remember your reactions to 
that story. I have another form, similar to the one you 
filled out last time. I want to make ,sure that the two 
forms do not differ. Please try to remember your ini­
tial reactions while completing the first form. 
Table l 
Order of Procedures in Each Bias-Test Condition for Experiments 1 and 2 
Session 
2 
2 
Immediate-immediate 
Read and React 
(FORM 1 or FORM 2) 
Bias (TRADITIONAL or 
NONTRADITIONAL) 
Reaction memory test 
Return only 
Read and react 
Extra statements (CONSISTENT/ 
MISLEADING) 
Bias (TRADITIONAL/ 
NONTRADITIONAL/NONE) 
Reaction memory test 
Recognition test 
Debriefing 
Return only 
Bias-test condition 
Immediate-delay 
Experiment I 
Read and React 
(FORM 1 or FORM 2) 
Bias (TRADITIONAL or 
NONTRADITIONAL) 
Reaction memory test 
Experiment 2 
Read and react 
Extra statements (CONSISTENT/ 
MISLEADING) 
Bias (TRADITIONAL/ 
NONTRADITIONAL/NONE) 
Reaction memory test 
Recognition test 
Debriefing 
Delay-delay 
Read and react 
(FORM 1 or FORM 2) 
Bias (TRADITIONAL or 
NONTRADITIONAL) 
Reaction memory test 
Read and react 
Extra statements (CONSISTENT/ 
MISLEADING) 
Bias (TRADITIONAL/ 
NONTRADITIONAL/NONE) 
Reaction memory test 
Recognition test 
Debriefing 
Note. Conditions of all between-groups factors in the design are indicated in uppercase letters. Subjects hearing the 
consistent extra statements received 'either the traditional or the nontraditional reaction bias; subjects hearing the 
misleading extra statements did not receive a reaction bias (NONE). ' 
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Results and Discussion 
A three-way analysis of variance indicated 
no reliable differences among conditions in 
initial reactions to the story. In order to eval­
uate memory effects, difference scores were 
computed by subtracting the initial reaction 
score from the test score. Since high reaction 
scores indicated a nontraditional view, pos­
itive difference scores reflected change in the 
direction of the nontraditional bias. Simi­
larly, negative difference scores reflected 
change in the direction of the traditional 
view. 1 
A three-way analysis of variance in differ­
ence scores· did not reveal a significant main 
effect of test form. Nor did interactions of 
test form with the other factors reach signif­
icance. Therefore, the data were collapsed 
across the test-form factor. For the following 
analyses, values of p < .05 were considered 
reliable, and MSe = 21.79. 
The r((sults clearly demonstrated an effect 
of outcome information on memory for pre­
vious reactions. Table 2 presents the mean 
difference scores for each bias type and bias­
test condition. The effect of the bias was 
much greater for the ID condition than for 
the other two bias-test conditions. This result 
is supported by the reliable interaction of bia� 
type with the planned comparison ofiD con­
dition versus II and DD conditions, F( 1, 
96) = 6. 4-3. The overall interaction of bias 
type with bias-test condition was also reli­
able, F(2, 96) = 3.22, as was the main effect 
of bias type, F(l ,  96) = 19.26. In or(ler to 
determine the conditions for which the bias 
effect occurred, analyses of simple main ef­
fects were performed. The bias reliably af­
fected difference scores for the ID condition 
only, F(l, 96) = 21.21; after 3 weeks the na­
ture of the outcome information was re­
flected in the subjects' attempts to remember 
how they had reacted initially. The direction 
of difference scores in the DD condition was 
not predicted and perhaps indicated a general 
forgetting factor. However, many subjects 
accurately reproduced their original reaction 
scores. 
Experiment 2 
·Memory for reactions appears to be vul­
nerable to interference from related infor-
Table 2· 
Mean Difference Scores for Each Combination 
of Bias Type and Bias-Test Condition 
(Experiment 1) · 
Bias type 
Traditional 
Nontraditional 
Bias effect 
II 
- 1.39 
1.00 
2.39 
Bias-test condition 
ID 
-3.78 
3.39 
7. 17 
DD 
-.78 
1.50 
2.28 
Note. Means were computed on the scores of 18 subjects . .  
II = Immediate-immediate; ID = Immediate-delay; 
DD = Delay-delay. 
mation in ways that may correspond to the 
effect of intervening materials on memory 
for facts. Certainly the results of Experiment 
1 were consistent with the effects obtained 
in Spiro's study of passage memory, even 
though the latter did not include a condition 
in which outcome information was delivered. 
immediately prior to the delayed recall tests� 
Delayed-bias conditions, however, were in­
cluded in two separate investigations of fac­
tual memory, one a series of experiments by 
Lqftus et al. ( 1978) and the other the research 
of Dooling and Christiaansen ( 1977). 
Loftus et al. presented slides of an auto­
pedestrian accident, followed by a verbal bias 
either immediately or after various delays 
associated with the timing of the retention 
test. The subsequent bias, contained in a 
questionnaire about the accident, was de­
signed to be misleading or consistent with 
respect to the original event. If a stop sign 
was present in the slides, for example, mis­
leading information implied the existence of 
1 Note that in the absence of bias effects, difference 
scores of a �ontrivial magnitude should indicate some 
form of general forgetting. As such, they might be ex­
pected to regress toward the mean value of reaction 
scores and produce a mean difference score around zero. 
However, the predicted results should not be con­
founded by a possible effect of regression toward the 
mean because initial reactions did not reliably differ 
across conditions. If subjects hearing a nontraditional 
bias happened to have produced a more traditional ini­
tial reaction mean, for example, a change in the direction 
of the nontraditional bias would also be considered a 
change in the , direction of the overall initial reaction 
mean. Mean reaction scores on the memory task were 
predicted to change in the opposite direction from the 
mean. 
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a yield sign. Errors involving false recogni­
tion of the yield sign increased with the 
length of the retention interval, but the larg­
est effect always occurred when the mislead­
ing information was presented ill1mediately 
prior to testing. 
A different approach to examining bias 
effects was taken by Dooling and Christiaan­
sen ( 1977). Like Loftus et al., they temporally 
varied the presentation of the bias within the 
retention interval. However, unlike the re­
sults of Loftus et al., their results indicated 
a larger bias effect when the bias was deliv­
ered 1 week prior to testing. Noting this dif­
ference, Dooling and Christiaansen suggested 
that their bias (providing a famous-person 
name for the previous fictitious passage) may 
have required "an active cognitive reorga­
nization" of information in memory for the 
passage. Such a reconstruction is cleaJly not 
required by the introduction of the yield sign 
in the experiments of Loftus et al. Further­
more, presenting a famous-person name 
(Adolf Hitler or Helen Keller) may have en­
listed structures for storing affective reactions 
and impressions, untapped by misleading in­
ferences concerning traffic signs. The name 
bias possibly pertained to complex memory 
structures; the sign bias affected representa­
tions for specific aspects of an event. These 
differences suggest that the mechanisms of 
influencing memory for reactions might dif­
fer from those affecting memory for · facts. 
Yet the modalities for presenting the to-be­
remembered events and the biases also dif­
fered across the studies. 
In Experiment 2, misleading information 
designed to influence memory for facts, or 
outcome information designed to affect 
memory for reactions, was orally presented 
following the same prose passage. All subjects 
were tested for reaction memory and fact re­
cognition.· If different patterns of results were 
obtained for the two memory measures, the 
alternative explanation of modality differ­
ences would be eliminated, and differing 
mechanisms for change still suspected. 
Method 
Materials. The prose passage and biasing informa­
tion from Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. 
However, forms for the reaction tasks were shortened 
to eight statements, preserVing the controls for possible 
extraneous preferences described in Experiment 1. State­
ments were omitted if they were reported as ambiguous 
in informal discussions with subjects or if the negation 
was structurally awkward. Additional items were elim­
inated to preserve the traditional/nontraditional bal­
ance. Two random orderings of the resulting two forms 
were used. 
As a context for providing the bias regarding memory 
for passage facts, three additional reaction statements 
were composed. The first statement (Statement 1 below) 
did not introduce misleading information or repeat orig­
inal information; it served as a buffer to avert any sus­
picion of a bias manipulation. The remaining two state­
ments varied according to condition of fact bias. State­
ment 2a was consistent with the passage, which reported 
Donna's interest in contemporary furniture, whereas 
statement 2b provided misleading information about 
antiques. Similarly, Statement 3a repeated that Donna 
had three children (consistent), whereas Statement 3b 
implied that she had only two (misleading). Misleading 
statements did not directly oppose original information, 
as did the yield sign in Loftus et al.'s experiments. How­
ever, they suggested events in ways that were not entirely 
compatible with the corresponding details of the passage; 
for example, we would not consider whether Donna 
would like to have more than two children, unless we 
inferred that she had two or fewer. And, at least for those 
who might agree that she liked to visit antique stores, 
Statement 2b might presuppose an interest in antiques. 
I. Donna enjoys spending her time fixing up their 
house. 
2a. Visiting furniture stores is one of her favorite pas­
times. 
2b. Visiting antique stores is one of her favorite pas-
times. 
3a. She would like to have more than three children. 
3b. She would like to have more than two children. 
The recognition test for passage facts consisted of eight 
two-alternative forced-choice items. Within each item, 
the target, a semantically accurate statement of passage 
information, was paired with an inaccurate distractor; 
for example, "She was a history major in college" served 
as a distractor for the statement that her major was En­
glish. Neutral items, irrelevant to the reaction state­
ments, occupied the first five positions and the eighth 
position on the list. They are listed in the Appendix. For 
Items 6 and 7, distractors referred to the misleading re­
action statements described above. These distractors, 
with target information in parentheses, were the 
following: 
6. Donna and Charles have two (three) children. 
7. She has taken decorating courses and knows a lot 
about antique (contemporary) furniture. 
Targets and distractors were presented in an order ran­
domly determined for each pair. A second list of the 
eight pairs differed from the original in that the within­
pair order was reversed. 
The fin� "debriefing" form used in Experiment 2 
contained an explanation of the manipulation concern­
ing memory for facts, following a technique employed 
by Loftus et al. ( 1978), and instructions to identify which 
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information was presented in the passage and which was 
presented in an additional reaction statement. The de­
briefing form contained the following information re­
garding Donna's interest in furniture. (The bias con­
cerning number of children was similarly revealed.) 
The study in which you have just been involved was 
designed to determine the effects of subsequent in­
formation on memory. In the beginning you read a 
story which stated that Donna knew a lot about either 
antique or contemporary furniture. Later you were 
asked to react to a statement about shopping at either 
antique or at furniture stores. Please indicate which 
information you were given at each point 
I read about 
antique furniture 
contemporary furniture . 
I reacted to 
a statement about 
antique stores 
furniture stores 
Subjects and design. Sixteen female volunteers from 
general psychology classes participated in each of the 
nine cells of the design. Factors were bias-test condition 
(II, ID, or DO) and bias type (traditional, nontraditional, 
or misleading). Subjects hearing either of the reaction 
biases (traditional or nontraditional) received only con­
sistent information in the additional reaction statements, 
and thus they served as controls for assessing the bias 
effects for facts. Subjects who heard the misleading bias 
for facts received no bias regarding outcome information 
and served as controls for the reaction bias. Forms for 
the reaction and recognition tasks were counterbalanced 
within each cell of the design. Course credit was again 
made contingent upon second-session attendance; all 
but two subjects returned and those were replaced. 
Procedure. For subjects receiving the traditional or 
nontraditional reaction bias, all procedures in Experi­
ment 1 were repeated in Experiment 2, augmented by 
the following. (Refer to Table 1 for a summary.) First, 
either immediately after the initial reaction task (II and 
ID conditions) or at the start of the second session (DD 
condition), the experimenter mentioned that three state­
ments had been mistakenly omitted before duplicating 
the reaction forms and would now be read. Subjects were 
instructed to listen to each statement but to write only 
the number chosen to indicate the extent of agreement 
or disagreement with each statement. The three consis­
tent statements (1, 2a, and 3a above) were then read. 
Responses were written at the bottom of the reaction 
forms by II and 'ID subjects and on a blank sheet of 
paper by DO subjects. Those in the DD condition were 
asked to take a minute to recall their general reactions 
before the statements were read, and they were provided 
with a judgment scale written on the chalkboard. After 
responses to the additional statements were collected, 
one of the two reaction biases was delivered. 
The remaining addition to the procedures of Exper­
iment 1 consisted of the recognition memory test, which 
followed the second reaction task in all groups, and was 
in turn followed by the debriefing task. The instruction 
for the recognition task was to choose the sentence from 
each pair which more accurately reflected information 
they read in the passage. The debriefing form was dis­
tributed without comment. 
Table 3 
Mean Difference Scores for Each Combination 
of Bias Type and Bias-Test Condition 
(Experiment 2) 
Bias-test condition 
Bias type II ID DD 
Traditional -.19 -1.94 -.13 
Nontraditional .63 2.25 2.50 
Control (misleading 
fact bias) 1.06 .56 1.69 
Bias effect .82 4.19 2.63 
Note. The bias effect is determined by subtracting the 
mean in the traditional condition from the correspond­
ing mean in the nontraditional condition. The effect of 
misleading information, designed to bias memory for 
facts but not reactions, can be assessed by comparing 
the control group means to the midpoints of the tradi­
tional and nontraditional means. Means are computed 
on difference scores from 16 subjects. II = Immediate­
immediate; ID = Immediate-delay; DO = Delay-delay. 
Treatment of subjects in the three bias-test conditions · 
who received the misleading bias for passage detail dif­
fered from the above only in the following ways. First, 
the additional statements consisted of the buffer state­
ment followed by the two misleading statements (1, 2b, 
and 3b above). Second, no outcome information was 
provided to bias their memory for reactions. 
Results 
Memory for reactions. Table 3 provides 
the mean difference between the reaction 
memory score and the original reaction score 
for each cell in the design. Although the bias 
effect in this experiment was weaker than the 
corresponding effect in Experiment 1 ,  as 
demonstrated by the lack of a reliable inter­
action of bias type with bias-test condition, 
the same pattern holds: The simple main 
effect of the bias was reliable only for subjects 
who heard the bias 3 weeks prior to the de­
layed memory test, F(2, 135) = 4.507, MSe = 
1 8.496. As in Experiment 1 ,  initial. reaction 
scores did not reliably differ among condi­
tions. Nor did misleading information re­
garding facts lead to reliable changes in mem­
ory for reactions across the bias-test condi­
tions. 
Recognition of facts. Table 4 presents 
mean percentage correct recognition for 
Neutral Items 1-� and 8 and Biased Items 
6,and 7. All subjects who heard outcome in-
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Table 4 
Mean Percentage Correct Recognition of Neutral 
and Biased Items as a Function of Bias Type 
and Bias-Test Condition (Experiment 2) 
Bias-test condition 
Items/bias II lD DD 
Neutral 
Consistent bias 95.8 78.1 78.6 
Misleading bias 96.9 78.1 79.2 
Biased 
Consistent bias 87.5 65.6 64.1 
Misleading bias 84.4 37.5 18.8 
Note. The data of 16 subjects contributed to each mis­
leading-bias mean. Means for consistent-bias groups 
were combined from the traditional and nontraditional 
reaction-bias groups and were therefore based on 32 sub­
jects each. Percentage correct recognition was computed 
on six neutral items and two biased items. II = Imme­
diate-immediate; ID = Immediate-delay; DD = Delay­
delay. 
formation to bias reactions were given con­
sistent information regarding facts. Since rec­
ognition differences between traditional and 
nontraditional outcome groups were not re­
liable and did not reliably interact with the 
other factors, the data from these groups were 
combined into a consistent-bias category. 
An analysis of variance, with between-sub­
jects factors of bias type (consistent or mis­
leading) and bias-test conditions (II, ID, or 
DD) and the within-subjects factor of item 
type (neutral or biased), revealed a reliable 
three-way interaction, F(2, 125) = 4.151, 
. MSe = .112. This interaction can be under-
Table 5 
stood to partially re'flect a reliable interaction 
of bias type with a linear trend in bias-test 
condition for biased items only, F(1, 135) = 
9.123, MSe = .088. It is clear that the effect 
of misleading information depended on both 
the delay of the bias and the d�lay ofthe test. 
In contrast,. correct recognition of neutral 
items was uninfluenced by misleading infor­
mation and reliably differed according to 
bias-test condition only, F(2, 135) = 22.829, 
MSe = .022; percentage correct recognition 
fell as the retention interval increased. 
Judgments, on the debriefi ng form. Table 
5 presents the pattern of judgments on the 
debriefing form, broken down according to 
whether the subject had correctly or incor­
rectly recognized the item on the recognition 
test. The fifth row indicates, for example, that 
out of th� 32 subjects in the delayed consis­
tent-bias condition, 24 correctly recognized 
Item 6, and 91.7% of those 24 were correct 
again on the debriefing form; 88.2% of the 
17 correct on Item 7 were also correct on the 
debriefing form. Continuing along the fifth 
row, all 8 of those who were incorrect on 
Item 6 and 67.7 of the 15 who were incorrect 
on Item 7 corrected themselves on the de­
briefing form; after reading about the nature 
of the experimental manipulation, these sub­
jects indicated that they had "really" read 
that Donna had three children or that she 
was interested in contemporary furniture. In 
a sense, the debriefing form may have served 
as a reminder for these subjects. However, 
when subjects who heard the misleading bias 
after the delay (the last row of Table 5) were 
' 
Percentage Correct on Debriefing Form For Recognition Items 6 and 7 (Experiment 2) 
Correct recognition Incorrect recognition 
Bias-test condition n Item 6 Item 7 Item 6 Item 7 
Immediate-immediate 
Consistent bias 32 96.6 (29) 96.3 (27) 66.7 (3) 60.0 (5) 
Misleading bias .16 100.0 (14) 92.3 (13) 0 (2) 0 (3) 
Immediate-delay 
Consistent bias 32 100.0 (24) 94.4 (18) 87.5 (8) 64.3 (14) 
Misleading bias 16 80.0 (5) 100.0 (7) 9.1(11) 11.1 (9) 
Delay-delay 
Consistent bias 32 91.7 (24) 88.2 (17) 100.0 (8) 67.7 (15) 
Misleading bias 16 66.7 (3) 100�0 (3) 15.4 (13) 23.1 (13) 
Note. The number of correct or incorrect responses on the recognition item is provided within parentheses. In each 
case, percentage correct on the debriefing form was computed on this number. 
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provided with the same reminder and expla­
nation, only 1.5.4% of the errors on Item 6 
and 23.1% of errors on Item 7 were corrected 
(changed on debriefing form). In general, the 
last two columns of Table 5 show that most 
recognition errors by subjects hearing the 
consistent bias were corrected after debrief­
ing but that only 7 of a total of 51 errors in 
misleading-bias conditions were corrected. 
Discussion 
Results concerning memory for reactions 
essentially provide a replication of Experi­
ment l; the bias effect occurred only for the 
ID condition. Differences between bias types 
appeared smaller than in Experiment l; this 
perhaps reflects the decrease in the number 
of items on the reaction sheet or gender dif­
ferences. (Subject availability dictated that 
only women participated in Experiment 2.) 
However, the more important point is that 
�he pattern of results remained the same. 
In contrast, a very different pattern of re­
sults emerged from the recognition test. Mis­
leading 'information influenced memory for 
passage facts after the 3-week delay and to 
a greater extent when it was provided im­
mediately before the delayed recognition test. 
These results, obtained from a verbal bias for 
verbal material, are very similar to the results 
of Loftus et al. (1978). Both sets of results 
concern memory for factual details, influ­
enced by implications of inconsistent infor­
mation. We all know, for example, that stop 
signs and yield signs do not share the same 
corners at intersections. Nor do people have 
two children and three children (unless they 
have five children). And, to some extent, peo­
ple preferring contemporary furniture do not 
search for antiques. When compared with the 
effects on memory for reactions,· these sub­
stitutional bias effects appear much more 
straightforward or direct. Moreover, rather 
than amounting to response bias effects, the 
recognition changes appear to occur on a 
memorial level, as demonstrated by debrief­
ing data in Experiment 2 and in the research 
of Loftus et al. 
In the debriefing task of Experiment 2, 
very few of the recognition errors made by 
subjects hearing the misleading statements 
were corrected after the nature of the rna-
nipulation was explained. ·These subjects 
were probably no more willfully tenacious in 
their errors than others (who most often 
chose the correct information on the second 
try). Instead their confirmed errors may sug­
gest that correct information was no longer 
accessible. It is also important to notice that 
this tendency not to correct the error was at 
least as strong in the immediate-bias, de­
layed-test condition, in which only 2 of 20 
errors were corrected after debriefing com­
pared with 5 of 26 errors in the delayed-bias, 
delayed-test condition. The effect· of the im­
mediate bias similarly cannot be attributed 
to confusion. 
Finally, obtaining a larger bias effect in the 
·delayed-bias condition cannot be attributed· 
solely to a general decline in passage mem­
ory. If such a decline invited use of tlte recent 
bias, it would do so differentially for Items 
6 and 7. Item 6 has higher overall recognition 
than Item 7 (see Table 5), yet the effect of 
misleading information is the same. In ad­
dition, a general decline should encourage 
use of the delayed consistent bias to boost 
recognition accuracy in the DO condition. 
Yet accuracy did not improve over the ID 
condition. Although the latter result is puz­
zling, it denies that the bias effect in the DO 
condition resulted only from poor passage 
memory. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 2, several aspects of the 
methodology for investigating memory for 
reactions differed from the corresponding 
aspects in studying memory for facts. Before 
much can be said regarding the possibility of 
different mechanisms in remembering reac­
tions and facts, some of the extraneous as­
pects of the tasks must be examined. Without 
pretending to equate the two sets of proce­
dures, Experiments 3 and 4 were designed 
to make the procedures somewhat more 
comparable. 
In Experiment 2, instructions to remem­
ber original reactions may have alerted sub­
jects to disregard subsequent reactions to a 
greater extent than instructions to remember 
the story suggested disregarding subsequent 
"facts." This possible difference in emphasis 
might contribute to an alternative explana-
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tion for the different patterns of results within 
delayed-bias, delayed-test conditions when 
bias and memory instructions were presented 
contiguously. Differing degrees of episodic 
distinctiveness of the bias, established through 
test instructions, could account for the ab­
sence versus the presence of bias effects in 
the DD conditions. Accordingly, one pur­
pose in conducting Experiment 3 was to vary 
the emphasis of disregarding subsequent in­
formation in remembering passage facts. If 
subjects who are explicitly directed to ignore 
possibly faulty references to passage facts still 
make recognition errors based on misleading 
statements, then episodic distinctiveness be­
comes less important as a rival explanation 
for reaction and fact 'differences. 
The second line of reasoning leading to 
Experiment 3 involved the respective natures 
of the memory, tests. Specifically, the test of 
memory for reactions appeared to require 
greater retrieval efforts than did the two-al­
ternative recognition test for facts. Not only 
were there six alternative ratings, but the 
choice with respect to any particular item 
had to be based partially on memory for a 
more general reaction because the original 
item was worded differently. In short, re­
membering reactions may have been made 
more complex a task than remembering 
facts. And since the reaction memory test 
cannot be converted to a two-alternative, 
forced-choice recognition task without losing 
all sensitivity, a cued-recall test of memory 
for facts was included as part of the proce­
dures of Experiment 3. The cued-recall task 
is clearly more similar to the reaction mem­
ory task in the amount of information that 
must be retrieved than is the recognition task. 
Method 
A total of 128 volunteers from general psychology 
classes participated in the three-factor design, 16 in each 
combination of bias timing (immediate or delayed), bias 
type (consistent or misleading), and instructions (pre­
vious memory instructions or explicit instructions to 
ignore all intervening references to story facts). An ad­
ditional group of 16 subjects served as a no-bias control, 
to assess the possible facilitative effect of repeating details 
in the consistent-bias conditions. 
The material and procedures of Experiment 2 were 
employed and modified in the following ways. Imme­
diate-test conditions were omitted, and all conditions 
were tested after the 3-week delay. No outcome infor­
mation was provided to bias memory for reactions, al-
though the reaction task was used in the first session as 
a rationale for the experiment and the reaction memory 
task was used in the second session to assess memory 
without the intervening reaction bias. The additional 
reaction items again provided the context for presenting 
the consistent or misleading bias for facts; they were read 
at the end of the first session (immediate bias) or at the 
beginning of the second· session (delayed bias). Then, 
following the reaction memory test, a cued-recall test of 
memory for facts preceded the recognition test. 
The cued-recall task was introduced with instructions 
that either duplicated the recognition instructions in 
Experiment 2 or stressed the importance of ignoring in­
tervening material, as did memory-for-reaction instruc­
tions in Experiment 2. In the first case, subjects were 
asked to remember details from the story and to provide 
an answer to each question, guessing if all else failed. In 
the second case, more explicit instructions stated that 
subjects should base their answers to the questions on 
their memories of the passage only and should not be 
influenced by any references to passage information oc­
curring in the meantime. The recall test consisted of 
eight questions, corresponding to the.content and order 
of items on the recognition test. Questions 1-5 and 8 
are listed in the Appendix. Questions concerning biased 
facts were the following: 
6. How many children do Donna and Charles have? 
7. What kind of furniture does Donna know a lot 
about? 
Finally, the recognition test was preceded by repeated 
instructions appropriate to each condition but was mod­
ified to describe the forced-choice procedure. It was fol­
lowed by the debriefing form. 
In summary, subjects in the immediate-bias condition 
read and reacted to the passage, heard the consistent or 
misleading extra statements, waited 3 weeks, then re­
turned for a reaction memory test, a recall test, recog­
nition, and debriefing. Subjects in the delayed-bias con­
dition did everything in the above order with one ex­
ception. They waited 3 weeks before hearing the extra 
statements, instead of after. In both conditions of bias 
timing, instructions for the recall and recognition test 
varied between subjects (see Table 6). 
· 
Results and Discussion 
Recognition. Table 7 presents averaged 
correct recognition ofltems 6 and 7, in each 
combination of bias timing, bias type, and 
instructions. A three-way analysis of variance 
revealed a reliable interaction of timing with 
type, F( l ,  120) = 3.800, MSe = .403,2 which 
indicates that the misleading bias had a larger 
effect when it was presented just prior to the 
delayed test. This outcome replicated the rec­
ognition results in Experiment 2. However, 
2 The error term is appropriate for analyses performed 
on numbers of responses, rather than the percentage 
measure. 
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the instructions factor did not reliably inter­
act with either timing or type, or produce a 
reliable effect alone. In fact, the pattern of 
means presented in the lower half of Table 
7 (instructions to ignore) closely resembles 
that above (previous instruc�ions). Although 
failure to reject the hypothesis of no differ­
ences is just that, it must be noted that the 
episodic distinctiveness of the bias remains 
unsupported as an alternative explanation of 
the reaction-versus-facts differences. This is 
the case because instructions more similar to 
those used in the reaction memory task 
yielded results typical of the memory-for­
facts effect. 
Unreported in Table 7, the mean per­
centage correct recognition in the no-bias 
control group was 56.3; a comparison with 
performance in conditions receiving a con­
sistent bias indicates no facilitative effect of 
repetition in the consistent conditions. The 
lack of a recognition advantage in the de­
layed consistent-bias condition may indicate 
that "contemporary furniture" is a difficult 
detail to remember and one that gets no 
boost from the consistent statement: Visiting 
furniture stores is one of her favorite pas­
times. 
Table 6 
Table 7 
Mean Percentage Correct Recognition of Biased 
Items (Experiment 3) 
Bias timing 
Instructions/bias Immediate Delayed 
Previous instructions 
Consistent bias 50.0 50.0 
Misleading bias 43.7 18.8 
Instructions to ignore 
Consistent bias 56.3 53.2 
Misleading bias 40.6 18.8 
Note. Each mean is based on the data from 16 subjects, 
and percentages are based on two responses per subject. 
Recall. Table 8 presents the mean per­
centage of correct answers to Questions 6 and 
7. Again, a three-way analysis of variance 
showed a reliable interaction of timing with 
type, F(l, 1 20) = 9.899, MSe = .285 (see 
Footnote 2). In addition, when the data were 
scored for number of errors reflecting the 
misleading bias, this interaction was again 
obtained, F( 1 ,  1 20) = 8.634, MSe = .497; the 
greater number of recall errors was produced 
by those subjects who heard misleading in­
formation, especially if it was delivered just 
Order of Procedures in Bias Timing Conditions in Experiments 3 and 4 
Session 
2 
2 
Bias timing 
Immediate Delay 
Experiment 3 
Read and react Read and react 
Extra statements (CONSISTENT /MISLEADING) 
Reaction memory test 
Recall test (PREVIOUS/IGNORE) 
Recognition test 
Debriefing 
Extra statements (CONSISTENT/MISLEADING) 
Reaction memory test 
Recall test (PREVIOUS/IGNORE) 
Recognition test 
Debriefing 
Experiment 4 
Read and react 
Bias'(TRADITION"'L or NONTRADITIONAL) 
Reaction test (MEMORY/NEW REACTIONS) 
Recognition test 
Debriefing 
Read and react 
Bias (TRADITIONAL or NONTRADITIONAL) 
Reaction test (MEMORY/NEW REACTIONS/DISGUISED) 
Recognition test 
Debriefing 
Note. Conditions of all between-groups factors in the design are indicated in uppercase letters. 
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Table 8 
Mean Percentage Correct (and Percentage 
of Bias Errors) in Recall of Biased Items 
(Experiment 3) 
Bias timing 
Instructions/bias Immediate Delayed 
Previous instructions 
Consistent bias 25.0 (40.6) 34.4 (37.5) 
Misleading bias 40.6 (37.5) 9.5 (7 1.9) 
Instructions to ignore 
Consistent bias 40.6 (28.2) 34.4 (28.2) 
Misleading bias 37.5 (34.4) 12.5 (68.8) 
Note. Means are computed on 16 subjects per condition, 
and percentages are based on two responses (to Ques­
tions 6 and 7) per subject. Mean percentage of responses 
scored as errors that reflected the misleading bias is pre­
sented parenthetically. 
before the test. These effects on the number 
of correct responses and the number of 
biased errors did not depend on the instruc­
tions factor, which did not reliably interact 
with either timing or type alone. Nor did the 
instructions factor produce a reliable main 
effect. In short, the pattern of recall errors 
was similar to the pattern of recognition re­
sults and thereby does not encourage serious 
consideration of complexity of the memory 
task as an alternative explanation of the re­
action-versus-facts effects. 
Debriefing and memory for reactions. 
Debriefing data were again examined to de­
termine the number of correct responses on 
the debriefing form as a function of the cor­
redness of recognition. These results were 
similar to those obtained in Experiment 2. 
Moreover, they did not reliably vary accord­
ing to the condition of instructions. Of the 
subjects who heard misleading information 
and allowed it to affect recognition perfor­
mance (incorrect recognition), none in the 
immediate-bias condition rectified the error 
on the debriefing form. Three of the 52 errors 
in the delayed misleading condition were cor­
rected, two of them under explicit instruc­
tions to ignore the bias. 
Finally, three-way analyses of variance 
were performed on the original reaction 
scores and on the difference scores. No reli­
able effects were obtained with either mea­
sure. The grand mean of the difference scores 
was .932, a result indicating that some 
amount of change in the direction of the tra­
ditional bias is perhaps built into the design 
of the reaction task methodology. 
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 3, instructions to remem­
ber facts were varied with respect to their 
explicit reference to biasing information, yet 
differential effects on recall or recognition 
were not obtained. In Experiment 4, the op­
posite approach was taken in attempting to 
make instructions with regard to the bias 
comparable for reactions and facts. Previous 
(Experiment 2) instructions to remember ini­
tial reactions clearly oriented subjects to dis­
regard any reactions to outcome informa­
tion, and these instructions were repeated in 
the memory instructions condition of Ex­
periment 4. However, in another instructions 
condition, disguised bias, the biasing out­
come information was presented as part of 
instructions to remember initial reactions. 
This approach obviously could be used only 
in the delayed-bias condition, but it appeared 
to be the only reasonable way both to mimic 
the deceptive conditions for biasing memory 
for facts and to specify that the task was to 
remember reactions, rather than to react 
anew. In this condition of instructions, sub­
jects were not alerted that biasing informa­
tion was novel or clearly different from pas­
sage information. In a similar fashion, sub­
jects in previous experiments had not been 
�erted that misleading factual information 
was different from corresponding passage 
facts. 
Two additional aspects of Experiment 4 
concerned the nature of the reaction task and 
the validity of the memory measure. First, 
additional subjects in each condition of bias 
timing and bias type �ere asked to indicate 
their current reactions to story information 
during the second session. These second re­
actions were designed to serve a comparative 
function regarding the memory scores. In 
particular, it was assumed in previous ex­
periments that outcome information would 
necessarily modify reactions; if this were not 
true, it would be difficult to understand the 
regularities in the difference score data. An­
other problem in interpreting the difference 
scores would result if, in contrast, new re­
action scores would tum out to be much dif-
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ferent from the initial reactions-if, for ex­
ample, they changed in an opposite directipn 
from that predicted for each bias type. 
Finally, the procedure in Experiment 4 in­
cluded a manipulation check in the form of 
a final debriefing questionnaire. Subjects 
were asked to indicate the most recent in­
formation they had received about the woman 
in the story; greater inaccuracy was expected 
from the disguised-bias condition. 
Method 
The nature of the disguised-bias condition of the in­
structions precluded crossing all three levels of instruc­
tions (memory, new reactions, and disguised bias) with 
the bias timing factor. pisguised-bias instructions were 
administered in the delayed�bias condition of timing 
only, but for both traditional and nontraditional types 
of bias. In the nontraditional condition, for example, 
disguised-bias instructions to remember initial reactions 
were as follows: 
The first thing we want you to do is to try to remember 
the story you read in the last session and your reac­
tions to that story. I know it's difficult, but I can't say 
much to cue your memory. Let me just remind you 
that at the end of the story the womari went back to 
school and is now a physiological psychologist. 
In the same manner, the traditional condition was told 
that the woman was thrilled about having another baby. 
Memory instruction, like those in Experiment 2, em­
phasized memory for initial reactions with no mention 
of outcome information. Instructions for the new-re­
actions condition of the instructions factor were uni­
formly the following: 
The first thing we want you to do is to try to remember 
the story you read in the last session, and to once 
again indicate your reactions to that story. Be sure to 
allow your responses on the reaction form to reflect 
any changes which may have occurred since your pre­
vious reactions. 
Twelve volunteers participated in each of the 10 cells 
of the design (two crossed factors of bias timing and bias 
type with two levels each, and the instructions factor 
with two levels crossed with the other factors and one 
level, disguised bias, nested within the delayed timing 
condition only). The procedure corresponded to that .of 
Experiment I in most respects. Immediate-test condi­
tions were omitted. Also, the test for fact recognition 
followed the reaction-memory test, to again assess pos­
sible effects of outcome information on memory for 
facts. The recognition test was followed by a debriefing 
form containing these statements: 
I. One aspect of this experiment concerns memory 
for information about Donna's life. Please indicate 
the most recent information you were given. 
(a) She recently gave birth. (b) She returned to college. 
(c) She developed an interest in psychology. (d) She 
developed an interest in decorating her home. 
Table 9 
Mean Difference Scores (Experiment 4) 
Instructions/bias 
Memory instructions 
Traditional bias 
Nontraditional bias 
New Reactions instructions 
Traditional bias 
Nontraditional bias 
Disguised Bias instructions 
Traditional bias 
Nontraditional bias 
Bias timing 
Immediate 
-.92 
3.25 
-1.00 
3.17 
Delayed 
-.33 
1.33 
-.83 
2.42 
-.25 
1.92 
-------------------------------
Note. Data from 1 2  subjects contributed to each mean. 
2. Please indicate the context in which you encoun­
tered the information you checked in Item 1 .  
(a) The information was presented i n  the story I read. 
(b) The information was presented by the experi­
menter. 
A correct response to Debriefing Statement 1 (alternative 
a or b) should reflect memory for the biasing information 
itself, whereas selection of one of the incorrect alterna­
tives should indicate that either the specific outcome 
described in the bias or the timing of its description (after 
the passage) is not remembered; responses to Debriefing 
Statement 2, especially by subjects who correctly iden­
tified outcome information, should clarify what they in­
terpreted "most recent" to mean. Correct responses to 
both debriefing questions might provide some indication 
of episodic memory for outcomes and were expected to 
occur most frequently 'under memory and new-reaction 
instruction, following a delayed bias. Incorrect responses 
were expected in the disguised-bias condition, as a check 
on the deception procedure. 
In summary, subjects in the immediate-bias condition 
read and reacted to the passage, heard either the tradi­
tional or the nontraditional outcome, waited 3 weeks, 
and then were tested for either new reactions or memory 
for initial reactions. Subjects in the delayed-bias con­
dition read and reacted to the story, waited 3 weeks, 
returned either to hear one of the outcome biases and 
to react anew, to remember old reactions following the 
explicit description of a biasing outcome, or to remem­
ber old reactions following a bias disguised as part of the 
instructions. Finally, all subjects took the recognition 
test and answered the debriefing questions (see Table 6). 
Results and Discussion 
Table 9 reports the mean difference scores 
in each of the l 0 cells of the design. Because 
of missing cells, these results were analyzed 
as two separate designs, one to compare new­
reaction instructions with memory instruc­
tions in each combination of bias timing and 
bias type (the top four rows of Table 9) and 
the dther to examine differences among all 
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Table lO  
Number of Correct Responses on the Debriefing 
Form in Each Condition of Bias Timing and 
Instructions (Experiment 4) 
Instructions 
Memory 
New reactions 
Disguised bias 
Bias timing 
Immediate 
Statement 1: 
Identifying 
most recent information 
16 
14 
Statement 2: 
Identifying source 
(given correct on Statement 1) 
Memory 
New reactions 
Disguised bias 
12 
11 
Delayed 
22 
19 
12 
22 
1 8  
8 
Note. The data were combined across bias-type condi­
tions; 24 correct responses; therefore, were possible in 
each combination of instruction and bias timing. 
three instructional conditions within tradi­
tional and nontraditional delayed-bias con­
ditions only (the right column of Table 9). 
Memory versus new reactions. A three­
factor analysis of variance failed to indicate 
a reliable interaction of timing and type with 
the instructions factor, even though the pat­
tern of differences suggests such an interac­
tion. Following memory instructions, a re­
liable bias effect was obtained under imme­
diate-bias conditions only, F(1 , 88) = 6.007 , 
MSe = 17 .341, a finding that replicates pre­
vious results. However, under instructions to 
react anew, the bias effect was reliable when 
delivered immediately, F(1, 88) = 6.007, as 
well as when delivered just prior to the sec­
ond reactions, F(l , 88) = 3.666. These results 
indicate that outcome information does 
change reactions and that the change is in 
the direction previously assumed for each 
bias type.3 
Instructional effects for the delayed bias. 
A two-factor analysis of variance did not re­
veal a reliable interaction of bias type with 
instructions. However, it is apparent in the 
right column of Table 9 that the bias effect 
under disguised conditions was not reliably 
different from the effect under memory con­
ditions; neither was reliable. [Employing the 
new error term still produced a reliable effect 
for new reactions at delayed testing, F( 1, 
66) = 4.790, MSe = 13.273.] The lack of a 
bias effect in disguised-bias conditions, of 
course, may be attributed to the weakness of 
the bias, yet the same must then be said about 
the "disguised" bias for the facts in Experi­
ments 2 and 3. Although difficult to interpret, 
this lack of a reaction-bias effect still differs 
from the replicated fact-bias effect. In making 
the procedures more comparable, the ar­
rangements of this study did not affect the 
divergence of outcomes. 
Responses on the debriefing form. Table 
10 presents the number of subjects in each 
condition of bias timing and instruction who 
correctly identified the bias as the most re­
cent information (top half) and the source 
of the bias, given correct identificatio11 of 
most recent (bottom half). A Pearson chi­
square test of independence indicated that 
subjects receiving an , immediate bias and 
memory or new-reaction instructions were 
less likely to correctly identify the most re­
cent information than were those receiving 
a delayed bias (xt = 6.544, p < .025). This 
manipulation check supports the notion that 
episodic information about the bias is not 
readily accessible after 3 weeks. Even among 
the 30 subjects in immediate-bias conditions 
who correctly indicated the most recent in­
formation (the bias), 7 reported that it had 
been presented in the story. This constitutes 
fairly direct evidence for loss of episodic in­
formation regarding the bias, considering 
that similar errors were not made by delayed­
bias subjects under memory or new-reaction 
instructions. 
In contrast, delayed disguised-bias subjects 
were often wrong about the most recent in­
formation, responding more similarly to im­
mediate-bias subjects than to those in the 
other delayed conditions. A chi-square test 
indicated that the three delayed conditions 
reliably differed in correctness on Statement 
l (xt = 11 .297,  p < .01 ). In addition, 4 of 
the 1 2  correct responders who had heard the 
disguised bias believed it had been presented 
3 Although identical effects of an immediate bias were 
not expected for new-reaction and memory instructions, 
their similarity is not surprising. After 3 weeks subjects 
should not be able to differentiate between old and new 
reactions. 
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in the story, a result somewhat confirming 
its disguise. More generally, the large number 
of errors ( 1 2  of 24) in identifying most recent 
information so soon after its delivery suggests 
that the ruse was on target. 
Recognition. Although no reliable effects 
were obtained with the overall recognition 
measure, correct recognition of Item 8 
("Donna is basically discontent/content with 
her life") was · significantly related to scores 
on the initial reaction task (r = - .24, p < 
.01 ). Larger initial reaction scores, indicating 
less traditional reactions, were associated 
with falsely remembering that Donna was 
discontent. 
General Discussion 
Memory for reactions or judgments con­
cerning events described in a passage appar­
ently is susceptible to interference effects, as 
is memory for facts from the passage. How­
ever, interference with reaction memory was 
achieved when 3 weeks separated the bias 
and test, whereas the largest effect on fact 
memory was obtained when the bias oc­
curred just prior to this delayed test. When 
various aspects of instructions and testing for 
reaction and fact memory were made more 
comparable in Experiments 3 and 4, the di­
vergent pattern of effects still held. 
One possible approach for understanding 
these differences is to focus on the nature of 
the memory representations and correspond­
ing process assumptions ( cf. Anderson, 1 978). 
· The initial processing task presumably results 
in representations of passage information 
and in representations of reactions to passage 
information. This distinction may require 
specification on a theoretical level, and its 
nature may be associated with the manner 
in which the information is generated ( cf. 
Jacoby, 1 978; Raye, Johnson, & Taylor, 
1980; Slamecka & Graf, 1 978). Specifically, 
the distinction between internally and exter­
nally generated memory representations ap­
pears to be related to the present differences 
between memory for reactions and memory 
for facts. According to Raye et al., greater 
accuracy regarding internally generated rep­
resentations can be attributed to the greater 
likelihood that they include information 
about the processes that produced them. If 
this is the case for representations of reac-
tions, information concerning additional re­
actions to outcome information and how 
they might differ from original reactions 
might be available for some period of time 
following the presentation of the outcome. 
In contrast, externally generated represen­
tations, such as those comprising passage 
memory, are not so likely to include infor­
mation about operations performed on them, 
such as the storage of inferences based on 
misleading statements. This line of reasoning 
leads to the speculation that we pay attention 
to our processing efforts when asked to think 
or construct a response but not when asked 
to read or listen. 
What follows from the generation distinc­
tion is that available evidence concerning 
cognitive operations can be used to make 
judgments required by test conditions. When 
we are made to think, we remember how we 
did it. In the present experiments, such evi­
dence presumably is accessible immediately 
following reaction biases and is useful in dis­
tinguishing old reactions from new reactions. 
After a delay of 3 weeks, subjects no longer 
appear to be able to make this distinction, 
perhaps because memory for specific opera­
tions, like other kinds of episodic informa­
tion, is no longer accessible. Similarly, very 
little information concerning the changes in 
externally generated passage memory is ac­
cessible under any condition, according to 
the present line of reasoning. The latter no­
tion is supported by the debriefing data in 
Experiments 2 and 3. Following a description 
ofthe manipulation regarding passage mem­
ory, subjects were still unaware of having 
been affected by the bias. Yet their false rec­
ognition of misleading information was 
greatest under delayed-bias conditions. This 
pattern of results may demonstrate a recency 
effect of biasing information that emerges 
when information regarding cognitive oper- · 
ations is unavailable. 
Admittedly, the value of the correspon­
dence between the reaction-versus-facts dis­
tinction and the generation distinction in 
accounting for the present differences is not 
strongly established. The usefulness of the 
analogy hinges on differential accessibility of 
information about cognitive operations, 
metamemorial information. This, of course, 
provides a possible direction for future re­
search. 
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A related issue focuses on the locus of bias 
generation. In the present experiments, 'the 
functional bias in memory for reactions was 
assumed to be reactions internally generated 
by outcome information; externally provided 
details served to bias fact memory.4 Perhaps 
this compatibility in locus of generation is 
important in obtaining bias effects, particu­
larly in reaction memory. On the other hand, 
considering the large body of evidence sug­
gesting that internally generated inferences 
lead to errors in memory for facts ( cf. Brans­
ford, Barclay, & Franks, 1 972), perhaps in­
ternally generated "biases" will always exert 
large effects, provided that information abOut 
the source of the bias is not accessible. 
Still another line of reasoning leading off 
from the present research involves the ease 
with which any source of relevant informa­
tion can be inserted within or added onto the 
representation of,previous information. The 
nature of reaction memory may logically re­
quire restructuring by biasing i!lformation, 
whereas facts may directly replace or strap 
onto other facts in memory, as well as re­
structure or .reorganize. Potentially, the re­
structuring operation could · require more 
time to show a bias effect, and replacement 
operations could produce immediate results. 
Again, restructuring operation may produce 
metamemorial effects as well as bias effects. 
All these issues, and others, remain to be ad­
dressed. 
A final consideration in the present con­
ceptualization is required for the obvious yet 
important observation that reactions and 
facts often differ in memorability. In most 
of the cases, remembering reactions should 
be an easier and more successful task than 
remembering facts. To be more precise, to 
the extent that reactions and judgments re­
quire more cognitive effort (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1 979; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & 
Ellis, 1 979), are associated with a high degree 
of internal generation (Raye et al., 1980), or 
involve self reference (Rogers, Kuiper, & 
Kirker, 1 977), they will be remembered bet­
ter than facts. This comparison, although 
difficult to make in specific real-world set­
tings, is quite relevant to the observation that 
we report our reactions along with the facts 
about events. It may be that we fill in hazy 
areas in our memories for facts with easily 
retrieved memories for reactions to the set 
of facts as a whole. Furthermore, this line of 
reasoning also suggests that a bias for reac­
tion memory strengthens that memory, in its 
altered form, through the very process of re-, 
structuring or regenerating. In contrast, a 
bias in memory for facts typically does noth­
ing but impose a last-minute change. 
4 The source of generating bias information is best 
conceived on a continuum from internal to external. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, misleading statements lead to in­
ferences that are more properly identified as the biases 
than are the statements themselves. However, competing 
elements in the biases (two children, antiques) are ex­
plicitly stated, in contrast to the unidentified elements 
of the reaction biases, which are entirely generated. A 
similar continuum underlies the distinction between 
representations of reactions and facts. 
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Appendix 
Materials 
Passage 
Donna Madison is thirty years. old and has lived 
in Albuquerque for most of her life. For the last 
ten years she has been married to Charles Madi­
son, who has worked his way into the upper eche­
lon of a small electronics firm. Donna met Charles 
in college, where she was an English major inter­
ested in twentieth-century American poetry. 
Charles was an average student but he had strong 
goals for his career. Donna was a very bright stu­
dent but seemed to lack a direction in her studies. 
However, she was certain that she was in love and, 
since she was raised traditionally, she decided to 
get married and have a family. 
Charles was a graduate student at the time. 
After their wedding Donna quit school and got 
a job as a secretary in the Psychology Department, 
in order to help support them. She worked until 
Charles finished his degree and she gradually de­
veloped an interest in psychology. She thought it 
would help her understand herself and others 
better. 
Donna quit the job two months before her first 
baby was born and has spent several years taking 
care of her family. She now has two boys and a 
girl, all under the age of seven. The five of them 
live in a charming old house which they have re­
modeled on weekends. Donna has taken interior 
decorating courses and knows a lot about contem­
porary furniture. Charles is very proud of his wife 
because she is a very good mother, an excellent 
hostess, and she provides a calm and well-orga­
nized home. Donna is basically content with her 
life. 
Examples of reaction statements 
1 .  Form 1 :  Donna doesn't feel that her husband 
has succeeded at her expense. (neg­
ative/agreement from traditional 
view) 
Form 2: Donna probably feels that her hus­
band has succeeded at her expense. 
(positive/agreement from nontradi­
tional view) 
2. Form 1 :  Being a wife and mother is not the 
most important thing in her life. (neg­
ative/agreement from nontraditional 
view) 
Form 2: She values her role as wife and mother 
above all. (positive/agreement from 
traditional view) 
3. Form 1 :  Donna is glad·she is able to be home 
with the children while they are 
young. (positive/agreement from tra­
ditional view) 
Form 2: Staying home with preschool children 
is not one of her priorities. (negative/ 
agreement from nontraditional view) 
Neutral recognition items (Experiments 2-4) 
1 .  Donna has been married to Charles for (ten/ 
fifteen) years. 
2. She was (an English/a History) major in col­
lege. 
3. Charles was (a very bright/an average) student. 
4. Donna quit work (two/six) months before her 
first baby was born. 
5. She thought psychology would help her un­
derstand (her husband/herself and others) 
better. 
8. Donna is basically (discontent/content) with 
her life. 
Neutral questions (Experiment 3) 
I .  How many years was Donna married to 
Charles? 
2. What was Donna's major in college? 
3. What type of student was Charles? 
4. How many months before her first baby was 
born did Donna quit work? 
5. Who did Donna feel psychology would help 
her understand? 
8. How did Donna feel about her life? 
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